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Note
THE REAL DEBATE OVER THE SENATE’S
ROLE IN THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS
WM. GRAYSON LAMBERT†
ABSTRACT
The five Supreme Court nominations between 2005 and 2010
brought renewed attention to the Senate’s role in the confirmation
process. This Note explores the debate over the Senate’s proper role in
that process. First, this Note summarizes and clarifies the two
traditional views of the Senate’s role, classifying them as the “assertive
view” and the “deferential view,” and offers a new framework for
understanding these views. This Note then traces the traditional
arguments made by proponents of these views. It first examines the
historical arguments, both from original understanding and historical
practice; it then turns to pragmatic arguments about which view better
accomplishes the purposes of the Senate’s participation in the
confirmation process. Neither the historical arguments nor the
pragmatic arguments resolve the issue of which approach to the
confirmation process is better.
By recounting these arguments, however, this Note reveals the
underlying—and unspoken—difference between adherents of the
assertive view and adherents of the deferential view: their conceptions
of the relationship between law and politics differ widely. Adherents
of the assertive view can fall on either end of a spectrum in
understanding the relationship between law and politics. For some
adherents of the assertive view, law is completely distinct from
politics, so they believe senators should carefully ensure that judicial
nominees understand this distinction and should vote only for those
nominees who do and will respect it. For other adherents of the
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assertive view, law and politics are two sides of the same coin, so they
think senators should aggressively inquire into the views of judicial
nominees and should vote only for those nominees whose views
comport with their own. Either way, the assertive view results in the
same role for the Senate in the confirmation process. Adherents of the
deferential view, by contrast, fall somewhere in the middle of the
spectrum, believing that law is underdetermined and is shaped, but
not totally controlled, by politics. Adherents of this view make certain
that nominees have reasonable legal views, but they are more willing
to vote to confirm nominees whose views differ from their own. This
Note brings this important difference to the forefront in hopes of
promoting more meaningful discussions about the Senate’s role in the
confirmation process.

INTRODUCTION
On July 20, 2010, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted 13 to 6
to send President Obama’s nomination of Elena Kagan to serve as an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States to the
1
full Senate with its favorable recommendation. During the
committee’s meeting before the vote, Senator Lindsey Graham
stated, “I could give you a hundred reasons why I could vote no if I
2
based . . . my vote on how she disagrees with me.” Senator Graham
clarified, however, that he based his vote not on whether he agreed
with Kagan’s views but rather on whether he believed she was
qualified for the federal bench and situated in the mainstream of
3
American legal thought in her views. He quoted Senator Phil
Gramm’s statement from the confirmation of Justice Breyer: “I am
going to vote for this nominee, not because I agree with him
philosophically but because I believe he is qualified. I believe he is
credible. I believe his views, though they are different from mine, are
4
within the mainstream of . . . thinking of his political party.”
Believing that Kagan fit this description and would “serve this nation

1. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Panel Backs Kagan Nomination, with One Republican
Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2010, at A11.
2. Executive Business Meeting on Nominations, S. 2925, and S. 3397 of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Sen. Graham, Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e54768
62f735da1604cd7.
3. Id.
4. Id. (omission in original) (quoting 140 CONG. REC. 18,672 (1994) (statement of Sen.
Gramm)).
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5

honorably,” Senator Graham supported Kagan’s nomination. Every
other Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee, however, voted
against recommending Kagan favorably to the full Senate because
they disagreed with how they believed she would decide cases as a
6
Justice.
The flurry of Supreme Court nominations between 2005 and
2010 brought national attention to the Senate’s role in the
7
confirmation process and, as a result, to the meaning of the
8
Constitution’s Advice and Consent Clause, which requires the
president to appoint federal judges “by and with the Advice and
9
Consent of the Senate.” Debates over the proper role of the Senate
10
in the confirmation process are not new, and this attention reflected
11
only another incarnation of a long-running battle. Traditional
arguments over the Senate’s role in the confirmation process first
12
focus on the history of the process. Yet the original understanding of
the Advice and Consent Clause and subsequent historical practice
provide no clear instruction for how the Senate should evaluate the
president’s judicial nominees. Thus, the debate typically turns to

5. Id.
6. See Stolberg, supra note 1 (discussing senators’ reactions to Kagan’s nomination).
7. See, e.g., The Samuel Alito Nomination, PBS NEWSHOUR, http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/law/supreme_court/alito (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (providing a list of stories
covering the Alito confirmation hearings); see also BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS:
PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES 3 (updated ed. 2009) (“Nominations to
the high court today represent major political confrontations, grand mobilizations of the
political bases of both parties, along with their affiliated interest groups and sympathetic
academics.”). The media, interest groups, and the public all focus on the Senate confirmation
process. See, e.g., JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 4–
5 (1995) (discussing the increased involvement of interest groups in the confirmation process).
As part of this attention, scholars debate whether the Court shapes society or society shapes the
Court. Compare Neil S. Siegel, A Coase Theorem for Constitutional Theory, 2010 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 583, 588 (arguing that the Supreme Court has the power to “shape[] popular values to a
nontrivial extent”), with BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION
HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION
371 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court has generally tracked public opinion).
8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
9. Id.
10. See generally HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A
HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II (5th
new & rev. ed. 2008) (tracing the history of Supreme Court nominations).
11. No agreed-upon standard exists for determining the Senate’s role in the confirmation
process. See David M. O’Brien, Background Paper, in JUDICIAL ROULETTE: REPORT OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 13, 76 (1988) (noting the
debate over the Senate’s proper role in the confirmation process).
12. See infra Part II.

LAMBERT IN PRINTER PROOF (2) (DO NOT DELETE)

1286

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/19/2012 3:16 PM

[Vol. 61:1283

pragmatic arguments about which approach best achieves the
13
purposes of the Senate’s involvement in the confirmation process.
But like the historical arguments, these purposive arguments shed
little light on the proper role for the Senate.
This Note seeks to reframe the debate over the Senate’s role in
the confirmation process to focus on the real issue that divides
commentators and senators: What is the relationship between law and
14
politics, and how does that relationship inform the Senate’s role in
the confirmation process? In Part I, this Note proffers a new
conception of the two major approaches that senators take in
evaluating judicial nominees. Part I.A describes what this Note terms
the “assertive view.” Adherents of this view focus explicitly and
specifically on a nominee’s ideology, voting to confirm only those
15
nominees whose ideological views fall within a certain narrow range.
Then, Part I.B examines what this Note calls the “deferential view.”
Adherents of this view argue that the Senate should be more
deferential to the president’s nominee and should confirm any
nominee who falls within a broadly defined “mainstream” of political
16
and judicial thinking.
Subsequent Parts evaluate the common arguments in favor of
these opposing views. In Part II, this Note traces the traditional
disputes between proponents of the assertive view and proponents of
the deferential view concerning the Senate’s historical role in the
13. See infra Part III.
14. “Politics” can be an amorphous term. In this Note, “politics” is defined as the process
of decisionmaking in a country, both within formal settings and throughout the nation as the
public engages in collective decisionmaking. Cf. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT, at 330–49 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (discussing the
creation of political society).
15. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, To Be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 8 (2009) (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary) (stating that he would “inquire into how [Sotomayor’s] philosophy . . . affects [her]
decision-making”); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. To Be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5 (2006) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary) (declaring his intention to question Alito on the independence of his views from
those of President George W. Bush); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G.
Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 15–18 (2005) (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Member, S. Comm.
on the Judiciary) (comparing his views of the adaptability of the Constitution to those of
Roberts to suggest that Roberts’s ideological views deserved especially careful scrutiny during
the hearings).
16. See supra text accompanying notes 3–5.
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confirmation process. Part II demonstrates that the original
understanding of the Advice and Consent Clause and the history of
the confirmation process do not resolve the debate over what the
Senate’s role should be. Next, Part III evaluates the pragmatic
arguments about whether the assertive view or the deferential view
better vindicates the values implicated in the confirmation process—
including judicial independence, judicial accountability, respect for
the rule of law, the need for qualified judges, and social cohesion.
Part III concludes that these arguments likewise fail to resolve the
question of which view is better.
With the shortcomings of these traditional arguments exposed,
Part IV sets forth the underlying source of the disagreement between
proponents of the assertive and deferential views: a dispute about the
relationship between law and politics. This disagreement leads to
dramatically different conclusions about the proper role of the Senate
in the confirmation process. After all, if law and politics are totally
distinct, then nominees—once they become judges—must decide
cases using only traditional tools of judicial decisionmaking, not by
reference to their ideological beliefs. Alternatively, if law and politics
are the same thing by different names, then judicial decisions will be
based solely on judges’ ideological beliefs. But if the truth lies
somewhere in between these extremes—if law and politics are to
some degree intertwined—then judges’ decisions will be influenced
by both their ideological views and traditional tools of judicial
decisionmaking. If this underlying disagreement is understood,
senators and scholars can more productively debate the Senate’s role
rather than dwelling on issues that are merely incidental to their real
17
difference of opinion.

17. Although the deferential view may hold the most promise for a respectful, successful
confirmation process, this Note does not seek to resolve the matter. Rather, this Note exposes
the shortcomings of the current literature on the confirmation process in the hopes of spurring
meaningful discussion. Furthermore, this Note also recognizes that the participants in the
confirmation process must consider more than just their views of the relationship between law
and politics. Political considerations and the relationships between the participants in the
process affect confirmations and shape the Senate’s role. The real world is full of moving parts,
but many debates over the Senate’s role focus not on these realpolitik considerations but rather
on what the Senate’s role should be. This Note focuses on this latter discussion, clarifying the
underlying disagreement in the debate. Although academic debates might lack the drama of
horse-race politics, these academic dialogues shape the ideas of the next generation. Ultimately,
this debate might not have a “right” answer that would require senators to adhere to one view
over the other. This Note merely seeks to provide a framework for more useful debates about
the Senate’s role.
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I. TWO MODELS OF THE SENATE’S ROLE IN THE CONFIRMATION
PROCESS
This Part proposes a new framework for defining and discussing
the Senate’s role in the confirmation process by casting the common
approaches to the confirmation process into two models. The first
model is the assertive view, under which senators take a very
aggressive approach to questioning nominees and focus intensely on
nominees’ ideological views. Two very different views of law and
politics can justify this view: the complete-distinction justification and
the no-distinction justification. Although supporters of these
variations start from radically different conceptions of the
relationship between law and politics, they end up with a similar view
of the Senate’s role in the confirmation process. The second model is
the deferential view, under which senators look only to see if the
nominee’s ideological views are within the mainstream. Senators who
adhere to the assertive view and senators who adhere to the
deferential view agree on two important requirements for all judicial
18
19
nominees: top qualifications and good character. What they
disagree on is the role that a nominee’s ideological preferences should
play in the confirmation process.
A. The Assertive View
As noted, under the assertive view, senators focus intensely on a
nominee’s ideological views. This focus on ideological orientation can
be rooted in either of two opposite views of the relationship between
law and politics. This Section discusses these two justifications for the
assertive view. The first justification is that law and politics are
completely distinct; the second is that law is just another form of
politics, so they are not distinct at all. The first justification is far more
18. See, e.g., Lindsey Graham, The Right Vote for Me and, I Believe, the Country, LINDSEY
GRAHAM (July 28, 2009), http://lgraham.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=About
SenatorGraham.Blog&ContentRecord_id=c2176c09-802a-23ad-4313-608b29022a59 (declaring
support for Sotomayor because she, like prior nominees Roberts and Alito, had strong
professional qualifications); ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 246–47 (noting that Lewis Powell had
little experience as a judge or academic prior to his nomination but received widespread support
due to his success as a former president of the American Bar Association); infra note 29.
19. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES (2009), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02A-Ch02.pdf
(setting forth the ethical rules for federal judges). This requirement of good character can also
be viewed as connected to the Constitution’s requirement of good behavior for judges to remain
on the bench. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges . . . shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour . . . .”).

LAMBERT IN PRINTER PROOF (2) (DO NOT DELETE)

2/19/2012 3:16 PM

2012] SENATE’S ROLE IN CONFIRMATION PROCESS

1289

common; the second is rarely invoked, at least by senators. Thus, this
Note focuses more on the complete-distinction justification, though it
also discusses the no-distinction justification to show how both
justifications lead to a similar role for the Senate in the confirmation
process.
1. The Complete-Distinction Justification. Adherents of this
justification of the assertive view believe that the law develops totally
20
independently of politics. Many senators adhere to this justification
of the assertive view, claiming that the distinction between law and
politics requires them to investigate fully whether a nominee will be
21
capable of respecting that distinction as a judge. Yet judicial
nominees, like all people, have personal views about the world and
about what the law should be. Those personal views can influence
22
judicial decisionmaking. Thus, senators who adhere to the assertive
view want to confirm only those nominees whose views of the law
align with the senators’ objective views of what the law is—the idea
being that, as judges, those nominees will decide cases in accordance
with the law and will not decide cases based on their ideological
23
beliefs. Adherents of the assertive view, including Senators Patrick

20. See, e.g., Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast May 31, 2009) (transcript available
at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31015497/ns/meet_the_press) (providing a record of Senator
Sessions’s comments that the law is distinct from politics).
21. See DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31989, SUPREME COURT
APPOINTMENT PROCESS: ROLES OF THE PRESIDENT, JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, AND SENATE
31–33, 36 (2005) (discussing the role of ideology in the confirmation process); John C. Eastman,
The Limited Nature of the Senate’s Advice and Consent Role, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 633, 652
(2003) (“[T]he Senate today appears bent on using its limited confirmation power to impose
ideological litmus tests on presidential nominees.”). Although scholars debate how much the
confirmation process has changed, many seem to agree with the “unobjectionable premise that
the judicial appointments process has become increasingly political and less genteel.” David R.
Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1047
(2008) (book review); see also Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Today’s Senate Confirmation Battles
and the Role of the Federal Judiciary, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 169, 173–74 (2003)
(“Whatever one’s political orientation, all sides agree on one point: it is the other side that is
‘playing politics’ with judicial nominations in an effort to exert control over the federal
courts.”). Although slight differences may exist between how certain senators approach the
confirmation process, this Section seeks to provide a broad sketch of how most senators think
about the process.
22. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) (discussing how a judge’s personal views can
influence that judge’s decisions).
23. Cf. ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 53 (arguing that politics is the paramount concern of
presidents in selecting a judicial nominee and that, because many people recognize the impact
of ideology on judicial decisions, senators will share this concern about a nominee’s ideological
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Leahy and Jeff Sessions—both members of the Senate Judiciary
24
Committee —and well-respected academics such as Professor Cass
Sunstein, maintain that the Senate has a strong and independent role
25
in the confirmation process. This role permits senators to question
nominees’ ideological views very closely to ensure that, as judges, the
nominees will base their decisions on the law rather than on their own
26
ideological views.
Regardless of which party controls the White House and the
Senate, the post-World War II confirmation process has been
remarkably consistent in its use of ideology, reflecting the prevalence
27
of this justification of the assertive view. When the president sends
his nomination to the Senate, the prevailing presumption is that the
president has selected a nominee with whom the president feels an
28
ideological compatibility. Members of the president’s party in the
Senate then typically hail the nominee as an excellent choice, whose
temperament and experience easily qualify the nominee to sit on the
federal bench. At the same time, senators of the opposing party
express grave fears that the nominee is a fierce partisan and unfit for
29
the bench. For example, Republicans praised President George W.
Bush’s judicial nominations, particularly Supreme Court nominees
John Roberts and Samuel Alito, whereas Democrats immediately
views). A nominee’s ideological views include the nominee’s political views and philosophy, as
well as any personal beliefs that shape the nominee’s worldview.
24. Committee Members, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, http://judiciary.
senate.gov/about/members.cfm (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
25. See, e.g., David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the
Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1501 (1992) (“[There exists] an independent role for
the Senate in the confirmation . . . process.”); supra note 15 and accompanying text.
26. What makes this form of the assertive view challenging in practice is the fact that
Republicans and Democrats often take conflicting views of what the law is or is constitutionally
required to be, thereby casting doubt on the clear distinction between law and politics that this
view claims exists. Cf. Amy Goldstein & Charles Babington, Roberts Avoids Specifics on
Abortion Issue, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2005, at A1 (noting the different views of abortion law
reflected by questions from Republicans and Democrats during Roberts’s confirmation
hearing).
27. ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 188–324 (tracing the development of the confirmation
process since World War II).
28. See id. at 52–53 (noting that the president focuses on a nominee’s “real politics” in the
nomination process); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1203 (1988) (“We take for granted that the President will nominate a
person whose general constitutional philosophy the President endorses.”).
29. Cf. Elisabeth Bumiller & Carl Hulse, Bush’s Court Choice Ends Bid After Attack by
Conservatives, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at A1 (demonstrating that the president’s party is
unlikely to back a nominee who appears unqualified both because of issues with the nominee’s
qualifications and uncertainty about how the nominee would decide cases).
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conveyed their concerns that these nominees held extreme views and
30
could not be trusted. Several years later, when President Obama
announced his Supreme Court nominations of Sonia Sotomayor and
Elena Kagan, as well as his circuit court nominations of Goodwin Liu
and Robert Chatigny, the roles were reversed, with Democratic
senators lauding the nominations and Republicans fervently
31
proclaiming their disagreement with the president’s selections.
These reactions naturally follow from senators’ beliefs that their view
of the law is correct and from concerns that a nominee who has a
different view of the law based on different ideological beliefs will
32
follow his own legal views.
Members of the president’s party feel comfortable stressing the
nominee’s qualifications and the wisdom of the president’s choice

30. See, e.g., Bush Nominates Alito to Supreme Court, CNN (Oct. 31, 2005), http://articles.
cnn.com/2005-10-31/politics/scotus.bush_1_confirmation-bush-nominates-alito-hearings
(“Conservatives lauded President Bush . . . for his choice of Judge Samuel Alito for the
Supreme Court, while liberals signaled a contentious confirmation hearing is ahead for the
nominee.”); Bush Picks Roberts for Supreme Court, FOXNEWS.COM (July 20, 2005), http://www.
foxnews.com/story/0,2933,163025,00.html (describing the positive reactions from Republican
senators to the Roberts nomination and the criticism expressed by Democrats).
31. See, e.g., Nominations Hearing of U.S. Circuit and U.S. District Judges: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 496–97 (2010) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“Republican members seem to be applying a standard
to President Obama’s nominees that they did not demand of President Bush’s . . . . Senate
Republicans . . . declar[ed] themselves ‘disappointed’ by the President’s nomination of Professor
Liu and claim[ed] that Professor Liu was ‘far outside the mainstream of American
jurisprudence.’”); Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Comments on the President’s
Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to the U.S. Supreme Court (May 26, 2009), available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=c351dc4a-5d99-4f20-aa07-4d991cc5a349
(“Judge Sotomayor has a long and distinguished career on the federal bench. . . . Her record is
exemplary.”); Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast June 28, 2010), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/video/elena-kagan-faces-confirmation-hearing-today-11031290
(recording Senator Sessions’s statement that “[activism is] what [Kagan’s] philosophy is”).
32. For Senator Sessions’s comments indicating that he was “troubled” by Sotomayor’s
views, see Meet the Press, supra note 20. If a senator believes that the law has a fixed meaning
that judges must apply and the senator is faced with a nominee who holds different views that
may limit the nominee’s ability to apply the law fairly, then the senator must believe that his
own interpretation of the law is the correct one and that the interpretation held by the nominee
is incorrect. Alternatively, these reactions could potentially be driven by political animus. Such a
conclusion, however, is generally based on speculation, rather than outright statements to that
effect. Compare Dan Balz, More Democrats Say They Will Oppose Alito, WASH. POST, Jan. 20,
2006, at A4 (noting Democratic senators’ stated reasons for opposing Alito’s nomination,
including fears about Alito’s legal views), with Democrats Continue To Embarrass Themselves
Regarding Judge Alito, ROSSPUTIN.COM (Jan. 30, 2006, 6:23 AM), http://rossputin.com/blog/
index.php/democrats_continue_to_embarrass_themselv (arguing that Democratic senators
opposed Alito’s nomination because of “political pandering” to liberal voters). This Note takes
senators at their word regarding their reasons for opposing judicial nominees.
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because they trust that the president has chosen a nominee who
generally agrees with the president and his party as to the meaning of
33
the law. These senators also discuss the nominee’s ideology, painting
the nominee as fitting well within the mainstream of American
34
political opinion. Senators who oppose the nominee similarly focus
their attacks on the nominee’s ideological views. These opponents,
however, try to paint the nominee as extreme and likely to base his
decisions on political rather than judicial considerations, a prospect
that in turn means that some of those decisions could be contrary to
35
established law. For example, Democrats alleged that Supreme
Court nominee Samuel Alito and Eleventh Circuit nominee William
36
Pryor would undermine civil rights for minorities and women.
Likewise, Republicans claimed that Sotomayor’s “wise Latina”
comment showed that she harbored racial and gender prejudices and
33. See ROBERT SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY 146 (1971)
(concluding that, as of 1971, presidents had succeeded in finding an ideologically compatible
nominee about three-fourths of the time). This fraction will most likely increase, given the
greater importance put on the screening of judicial nominees since the Reagan administration.
See O’BRIEN, supra note 27, at 69 (noting that the Reagan administration established “the most
rigorous process for judicial selection ever”).
34. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, supra
note 15, at 4 (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“My
review of [Judge Sotomayor’s] judicial record leads me to conclude that she is a careful and
restrained judge with a deep respect for judicial precedent and for the powers of the other
branches of the Government, including the law-making role of Congress.”); Confirmation
Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., supra note 15, at 1028 (statement of Sen.
Richard G. Lugar) (“I have every confidence that Judge Roberts, in addition to the
extraordinary intellectual, professional and personal qualities he will bring to the task of leading
our Nation’s highest court, will also bring a profound understanding of and commitment to the
transcendent principles . . . about the proper role of the judiciary in our constitutional system.”).
35. Often, members of the president’s party appear to be favoring the deferential view,
whereas senators of the opposing party appear to follow the assertive view. See supra notes 29–
32 and accompanying text. In reality, a senator who adheres to the assertive view at any time is
likely to be a consistent adherent of the assertive view. The senator simply sees the need to be
more assertive when the nominee holds different views than the senator does, and the senator
has less need to be so assertive when the nomination is made by a president of that senator’s
party because the president would presumably have already screened the nominee. See
ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 52 (“Among the points a president is almost certain to consider
[includes] . . . whether the nominee has been a loyal member of the president’s party . . . .”).
36. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Barbara Boxer, Democratic Women Senators United
in Opposition to the Nomination of Judge Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 31, 2006),
available at http://boxer.senate.gov/en/press/releases/013106.cfm (providing statements from
female Democratic senators describing Alito as biased against the rights of women); James
Rowley, William Pryor Confirmed by U.S. Senate to Appeals-Court Seat, BLOOMBERG (June 9,
2005, 4:30 PM EDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=awAIx
BHXqL1M (noting the objections from Democrats that Pryor had opposed civil rights earlier in
his career and lacked the appropriate temperament for the federal bench).
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that Kagan’s restrictions on military recruiters at Harvard Law School
37
demonstrated her bias against the military.
Ultimately, hearings and confirmation votes for the most high38
profile nominations generally fall along partisan lines. These votes
capture the assertive view of advice and consent: a senator votes for a
nominee only if the senator believes the nominee holds ideological
views that align with the senator’s views about what the law is.
2. The No-Distinction Justification. The second justification,
39
grounded in legal realism, is based on the view that law is merely
another form of politics. Under this approach, because the law is the
means for achieving political results, a senator votes in favor of only
those nominees whose ideological views align with his own, believing
that those nominees’ rulings as judges will develop the law in a way
that the senator favors.
40
Although this justification has some support among academics,
senators typically do not invoke it. Senators may rely on the

37. E.g., David M. Herszenhorn & Carl Hulse, Parties Plot Strategy as Sotomayor Visits
Capitol, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2009, at A20 (noting that Republican senators sought to use
Sotomayor’s comments about a “wise Latina” being a better judge as evidence of her prejudicial
views); Bernie Becker, Alexander a No on Kagan, N.Y. TIMES THE CAUCUS BLOG (July 23,
2010, 1:39 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/alexander-a-no-on-kagan (stating
that Senator Lamar Alexander planned to vote against Kagan’s nomination because of “his
concern over her decision to ban military recruiters from parts of the campus while she was
dean of Harvard Law School”).
38. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. 361 (2006) (recording the Senate’s roll-call vote on Alito’s
Supreme Court nomination, in which fifty-four of fifty-five Republican senators voted in favor
of confirmation and forty-one of the forty-five senators who caucused with the Democrats voted
against confirmation). Of course, vote counts might reflect a genuine disagreement among
senators even if all senators adhered to the deferential view, so vote counts are not necessarily
accurate indicia of the assertive view in action. Nominations that receive less attention often do
not generate bitter partisan fights, presumably because fighting over such nominees is not worth
the political capital of senators who might potentially oppose those nominees. Cf. LEE EPSTEIN
& JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 92
(2005) (“No more than one out of every five nominations to the lower courts over the last five
decades has generated objections of any type . . . .”). Nevertheless, when votes regularly fall
along party lines, those votes suggest that senators are supporting only nominees with whom
they agree ideologically.
39. For a foundational text of what became the legal-realist school of thought, see Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
40. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 38, at 3 (arguing that senators should care
about a nominee’s ideological views because judges are political and their personal views shape
the law). Other academics, of course, strongly disagree. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, Essay, The
President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors
Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 665 (1993) (noting with disfavor the idea that judges
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complete-distinction justification instead either because they
genuinely believe that the justification is correct or because they
41
believe that doing so is a political necessity. This Note takes senators
at their word about why they adhere to the assertive view.
Nevertheless, this Note includes the no-distinction justification
because doing so gives a more complete description of the debate
over the Senate’s role in the confirmation process.
B. The Deferential View
Under the deferential view, senators look only to whether a
nominee’s views fall within a broad mainstream. In the late twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries, the deferential view has not been as
42
prominent as the assertive view, but it retains some influence.
During the confirmation hearings for Kagan and Sotomayor, Senator
Graham was the deferential view’s most ardent proponent and drew
widespread attention for his approach to the Senate’s role in the
43
confirmation process. During the Senate Judiciary Committee’s
debate over whether to send Kagan’s nomination to the full Senate,

“mak[e] policy on a set of discrete issues rather than applying a coherent body of legal theory to
all cases”).
41. Given the “increasingly partisan” atmosphere of the confirmation process, WITTES,
supra note 7, at 5, and how “the [informal] rules have fundamentally changed” so that that most
members of the opposing party automatically object to a nominee, id. at x, reason may exist to
doubt these statements from senators. Regardless, the two justifications of the assertive view
lead to similar roles for the Senate in the confirmation process, and the underlying debate over
the Senate’s role can be clarified without knowing senators’ true motivations.
42. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. 18,667–69 (1994) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter)
(describing his deference to President Clinton’s nomination of Stephen Breyer because Breyer
was qualified to sit on the Supreme Court and was within the mainstream in his thinking); see
also, Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 135–36 (1994)
(statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting that,
although he did “not agree with Judge Breyer on every issue,” Senator Thurmond would still
support Breyer’s nomination because Breyer had a strong resume and had the “proper judicial
temperament”). This view was also influential among the “Gang of 14” in 2005. See Senators
Compromise on Filibusters, CNN (May 24, 2005, 12:20 AM EDT), http://www.cnn.com/2005/
POLITICS/05/23/filibuster.fight (describing the compromise reached by the Gang of 14).
43. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, Op-Ed., Standing Tall Against the Purity Police, WASH. POST,
Mar. 14, 2010, at A17 (noting that Senator Graham broke with his party on judicial nominations
as well as on other issues); Jay Newton-Small, Lindsey Graham: New GOP Maverick in the
Senate, TIME (Dec. 23, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1949766,00.html
(discussing Senator Graham’s “reputation as an independent dealmaker” and his vote for
Sotomayor). See generally Robert Draper, This Year’s Maverick, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 4,
2010, at 22 (describing Senator Graham as willing to work with both Republicans and
Democrats to build consensus on various issues).
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Senator Graham described his view of advice and consent. His
similar statements about voting in favor of Sotomayor’s
45
confirmation reflected earlier articulations of the approach.
In calling for the Senate to return to the “Qualification
Standard” that Senator Graham said the Senate had used for most of
46
its history, Senator Graham’s statement set out three considerations
for analyzing judicial nominees: qualifications, character, and
47
ideological views. These factors featured in earlier articulations of
48
the deferential view, such as the views of Senators John Warner and
49
Charles Mathias. When analyzing these considerations, adherents of
the deferential view argue that senators should give the president’s
choice
a
presumption
of
confirmability
because
“the
Constitution . . . puts a requirement on [senators] to not replace
50
[their] judgment for [the president’s].” This deference means that
votes against a nominee should presumably be “the exception, not the
51
rule” and that a senator should vote against a nominee only in “an
52
extraordinary circumstance.” Under this approach, a senator votes
for or against a nominee based not on whether the senator would

44. Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Graham, Member, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary).
45. Graham, supra note 18.
46. Id. (calling for the Senate to “go back to the judicial standard for Supreme Court
nominees which served our country well for over 200 years—the ‘Qualification Standard’”).
47. Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2; see also Graham on Senate Confirmation of
Judge Tim Cain, SC BUSINESS BLOG, http://scbusinessblog.com/?p=538 (last visited Feb. 14,
2012) (quoting Senator Graham as noting that a judicial nominee who “possesse[d] a great
combination of intellect, integrity, common sense, and judicial demeanor” ought to be
confirmed).
48. See 147 CONG. REC. 14,024–25 (2001) (statement of Sen. Warner) (providing reasons
why the Senate should confirm a circuit court nominee).
49. See Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Advice and Consent: The Role of the United States
Senate in the Judicial Selection Process, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 200, 204 (1987) (citing a nominee’s
intellect, temperament, and experience as factors to consider in evaluating a nominee).
50. Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Lindsey O. Graham,
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); see also 139 CONG. REC. 18,141 (1993) (statement of Sen.
Strom Thurmond) (stating that he would give Ruth Bader Ginsburg “the benefit of any
doubts”).
51. Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Lindsey O. Graham
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
52. Graham, supra note 18. Such “extraordinary circumstance[s]” might occur if the
nominee were to be related to the president or were to attempt to bribe someone to obtain the
appointment. Id.
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have nominated that particular person but rather based on whether
53
the nominee is a reasonable choice to sit on the federal bench.
Like the assertive view, the deferential view is shaped by its
conception of the relationship between law and politics. Proponents
54
of this view acknowledge the underdeterminacy of law. They accept
the idea that, in a diverse society, people can hold different yet
equally reasonable views. In elections, such differences lead people to
55
cast ballots for different candidates, and the winner of the
presidential election gets the power to nominate judges. The party
that loses an election is willing to accept the nominees of the winning
party because the losing party knows that it can win the next election
and put its nominees on the bench, thus helping to develop the law in
a way that the losing party prefers.
Based on this view of the relationship between law and politics,
Senator Graham’s analysis of a nominee’s ideological perspective
differs from an analysis under the assertive view because Senator
Graham is willing to confirm nominees who fit within a broad range
56
of ideological views. The deferential view seeks to determine only if

53. See 151 CONG. REC. 26,071 (2005) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch) (stressing that
senators must look at how a judge decides a case, not just the outcomes of decisions).
54. The underdeterminacy of law is the idea that the development of the law is partially
controlled by existing legal doctrines and partially influenced by political events. Lawrence B.
Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473
(1987). The indeterminacy of law is the idea that the development of the law is completely
controlled by political events. Id.; cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124–25 (1961)
(discussing the “open texture” of the law in its development). The determinacy of law is the idea
that the development of the law is unchangeably dictated by existing legal doctrines, Solum,
supra, at 473, as if the law were handed down from on high in the same way God gave Moses the
Ten Commandments on Mount Sinai, see Exodus 19:1–20:21. Thus, the underdeterminacy of
law is a middle ground between these extreme positions: adherents of the deferential view do
not believe that law and politics are synonymous, see Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2
(statement of Sen. Lindsey O. Graham, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting “a
difference between politics and the law”), nor do they believe that law and politics are totally
unrelated, see Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, supra note
15, at 425 (statement of Sen. Lindsay O. Graham, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“[Y]ou
are not going to find a law book that tells you whether a fundamental right exists vis-à-vis the
Second Amendment . . . [;] you are going to have to rely upon your view of America, who we
are, how far we have come and where we are going to go, and our relationship to gun
ownership.”). Rather, they believe that judges, although influenced by their beliefs, still base
their decisions on traditional methods of legal decisionmaking.
55. See generally THE PARTY’S JUST BEGUN: SHAPING POLITICAL PARTIES FOR
AMERICA’S FUTURE (Larry J. Sabato & Bruce Larson eds., 2d ed. 2009) (discussing how voters
choose political parties and candidates based on the views and positions of those candidates and
parties).
56. Compare supra notes 30–31, with supra note 4.
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a nominee’s thinking fits within a broad range of reasonable beliefs,
unlike the assertive view, which focuses on whether a nominee’s
views are likely to align with a senator’s own views of the law.
Defining what views are reasonable can be difficult. For Senator
Graham, a nominee’s thinking falls outside this broad range of
acceptable views when the nominee holds views that are outside of
57
the mainstream of American politics. According to Senator Graham,
a nominee with extreme ideological commitments is more likely to
decide cases in a way that causes the law to develop outside of
generally accepted American ideological views; such a nominee is
likely to decide cases without any reliance on traditional tools of
58
judicial decisionmaking. Likewise, Senator Gramm described
acceptable views as those “within the mainstream of the thinking of
59
[the nominee’s] political party.” Senator Jim Talent expressed a
variety of this view as well, noting that no one narrow mainstream
exists but rather that a judicial nominee can hold a wide range of
60
reasonable positions.
Several nominations illustrate Senator Graham’s conception of
the mainstream. For instance, although Senator Graham
acknowledged that Sotomayor was “far more liberal than [he] would
prefer,” he thought that she was “within the mainstream,” a fact that
61
was demonstrated by her writings and opinions. Likewise, Senator
Graham stated that, despite his disagreements with Kagan, she was
also within the mainstream, even though most Senate Republicans
62
disagreed. Senator Graham similarly believed that Alito was within
the mainstream, even though many Democrats disagreed with
63
Senator Graham’s assessment of Alito’s views. Ultimately, Senator
Graham showed how broad the acceptable range could be when he
opined that Kagan was confirmable even though she had named
Israeli jurist Aharon Barak as her hero. Senator Graham noted his

57. See supra text accompanying note 4.
58. See Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Graham, Member, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary) (recognizing that a judge’s views influence decisions); see also 132
CONG. REC. 23,813 (1986) (statement of Sen. Pete V. Domenici) (stating that a nominee’s
personal philosophy is only relevant if it “undermines the fundamental principles of our
constitutional system” or threatens the nominee’s ability to judge impartially).
59. 140 CONG. REC. 18,672 (1994) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
60. 151 CONG. REC. 7875–76 (2005) (statement of Sen. Talent).
61. Graham, supra note 18.
62. See supra note 37.
63. See supra note 36.
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hope that a conservative whose hero was former judge and Professor
64
Robert Bork could also be confirmed.
Some nominees, however, fall outside the mainstream as defined
by Senator Graham. On the left, Senator Graham opposed Goodwin
65
Liu’s nomination to the Ninth Circuit, and on the right, he opposed
66
the nomination of William Haynes to the Fourth Circuit. In Senator
Graham’s eyes, both Liu and Haynes held extreme views—Liu about
welfare rights and Haynes about limits on executive power—that
67
were not generally accepted by either political party. Thus, these
nominees fell outside the mainstream, and Senator Graham did not
68
support their nominations.
The contrast between the assertive view of the Senate’s adviceand-consent role and the deferential view is striking. Although both
views consider the nominee’s ideology, they do so in meaningfully
different ways. Given these differences, each interpretation of the
Senate’s role has very different implications for the confirmation
process.
II. THE HISTORY OF ADVICE AND CONSENT
The assertive view and the deferential view described in Part I
have been present throughout the history of judicial confirmations. In
arguing about which view is better, proponents of each view often
focus on the original understanding of the Advice and Consent
Clause and on the historical practice of the confirmation process
rather than on the underlying disagreement about the relationship

64. Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Graham, Member, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary). Barak is the former president of the Supreme Court of Israel who was
noted for his very liberal views. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Praise for an Israeli Judge Drives
Criticism of Kagan, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/us/politics/
25kagan.html (describing Kagan’s admiration of Barak).
65. See Press Release, Senator Lindsey Graham, Graham Votes Against Liu Nomination
(May 13, 2010), available at http://lgraham.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=
PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=933C8744-802A-23AD-401E-1F426661C02A
(providing Senator Graham’s reasons for opposing Liu’s nomination).
66. See Kate Zernike, G.O.P. Senator Resisting Bush over Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, July 18,
2006, at A1 (“[Senator Graham] raised questions about the judicial nomination of William J.
Haynes II, the Pentagon general counsel who helped write a memorandum that narrowly
defined torture only as treatment that causes pain similar to death or major organ failure.”).
67. See sources cited supra notes 65–66.
68. Of course, other senators disagreed with Senator Graham about these nominees, and
the lack of clear standards for determining what views fall outside the mainstream makes the
deferential view difficult in practice.
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between law and politics. These debates over the original
understanding and history of the Advice and Consent Clause have
been well chronicled in many places and have been debated by
69
countless scholars and senators. Thus, this Part does not seek to
recount these historical arguments in their entirety. Instead, it sets out
enough of these debates to demonstrate that compelling arguments
exist in favor of both the assertive view and the deferential view. The
ability of both views to find support in the historical record suggests
that history alone cannot determine which view of advice and consent
70
the Senate should adopt. These historical arguments do not reveal
the underlying disagreement between the assertive view and the
deferential view, but understanding these arguments is important for
putting the most fundamental difference between these views in
context and for providing enough background to appreciate that
difference.
A. The Original Understanding of the Advice and Consent Clause
1. The Constitutional Convention.
The Constitutional
Convention, for all its laborious efforts, actually left little insight into
the Framers’ thinking about the Advice and Consent Clause. This
short sketch of the Convention’s discussion of judicial appointments
provides the framework for analyzing the original understanding of
the Advice and Consent Clause.
On May 29, 1787, Edmund Randolph introduced his fifteenpoint Virginia Plan, which called for “a National Judiciary . . . to be
71
chosen by the National Legislature.” The Committee of the Whole
discussed this proposal on June 5, with James Wilson noting that

69. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 10; MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 15–77 (2000);
Mathias, supra note 49. This Note provides anecdotes from the history of the confirmation
process to demonstrate that both the assertive view and the deferential view can find support in
historical practice. For a brief history of how the practices and procedures of judicial
nominations have changed, see generally RICHARD S. BETH & BETSY PALMER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL33247, SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS: SENATE FLOOR PROCEDURE
AND PRACTICE, 1789–2011 (2011).
70. Furthermore, some commentators and judges may not accept a historical argument as
binding, even if that argument conclusively proves the original understanding of the debated
text. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 5–6 (2005) (arguing that history should not necessarily be the lynchpin of legal
argument).
71. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 32
(Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (1840).
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appointment by the executive was favorable because such a system
would charge “a single, responsible person” with the selection of
72
judges. During that same debate, James Madison argued that the full
legislature might not know what made good judges but that giving the
power to one person was unwise. Thus, Madison proposed that the
Virginia Plan’s language of “appointment by the Legislature” be
73
struck and the power be given to the Senate. This motion was
74
75
adopted. Madison defended this position on June 13, eventually
convincing Roger Sherman and Charles Pinckney to withdraw their
motion to institute appointment by the entire legislature rather than
76
just the Senate. Soon thereafter, William Paterson presented the
New Jersey Plan, which called for judges “to be appointed by the
77
Executive.” A few days later, on June 18, Alexander Hamilton, in
response to the New Jersey Plan, proposed his own plan. His proposal
called for presidential appointment, “subject to the approbation or
78
rejection of the Senate.” On June 19, however, the Convention
rejected the approaches of both Hamilton’s plan and the New Jersey
79
Plan, leaving the appointment power with the Senate.
When the Convention next discussed judicial appointments on
July 18, Nathaniel Gorham proposed that judges be appointed by the
80
president with the “advice [and] consent” of the Senate. Gorham
claimed that the president would “be careful to look through all the
81
States for proper characters” to appoint as judges. This proposal
sparked further debate on the topic; some delegates, such as Luther
Martin and Roger Sherman, still believed that the appointment power
should belong to the Senate, whereas others, including Wilson,
82
supported Gorham’s proposal. The Convention, however, did not

72. Id. at 67.
73. Id. at 68 (emphasis omitted).
74. Id. at 68–69.
75. Id. at 112–13 (“The [judicial] candidate who was present, who had displayed a talent for
business in the legislative field, who had perhaps assisted ignorant members in business of their
own, or of their Constituents, or used other winning means, would without any of the essential
qualifications for an expositor of the laws prevail over a competitor not having these
recommendations, but possessed of every necessary accomplishment.”).
76. Id. at 113.
77. Id. at 120.
78. Id. at 138.
79. Id. at 150.
80. Id. at 314.
81. Id. at 315.
82. Id. at 315–17.
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adopt Gorham’s proposal. The same day, the Convention also
rejected Madison’s alternative plan, which would have given the
president the power to appoint judges and the Senate the power to
84
veto the appointment with a two-thirds vote. A few days later, the
85
Convention referred the matter to the Committee of Detail. When
the committee returned its report on August 6, the Senate still had
86
the power to appoint judges. Then, on September 4, with virtually no
discussion, the Convention changed course, adopting an “advice and
87
consent” scheme much like the one Gorham had proposed. Thus the
Constitution’s scheme of judicial appointments was born, reflecting a
compromise between those delegates who believed the executive
should have the sole appointment power and those delegates who
wanted the legislature to appoint judges.
2. Ratification Debates and the First Congresses. As ratified in
the Constitution, the “vaguely worded textual grant of power” to the
Senate to advise and consent to judicial nominees gives little guidance
88
as to how the Framers intended the power to be used. Proponents of
both the assertive view and the deferential view can find support from
the Constitutional Convention and the Founding era to support their
interpretation of the proper understanding of the Advice and
Consent Clause.
89
For the assertive view, Madison’s Notes clearly suggest that
many delegates were wary of giving too much power to the executive
and consistently rejected plans to give the executive an unchecked
90
power to appoint judges. The inclusion of the Senate in the process
at all meant, in the words of James Gauch, that the Framers “tacitly

83. Id. at 317.
84. Id. at 344.
85. Id. at 383.
86. Id. at 391.
87. Id. at 575.
88. WITTES, supra note 7, at 104; see also Derek P. Langhauser, Essay, Nominations to the
Supreme Court of the United States: Historical Lessons for Today’s Debate, 205 EDUC. L. REP.
553, 556 (“[T]he Constitution provides little clear guidance on how the Framers intended the
Senate to use its advice and consent powers when reviewing Supreme Court nominees.”);
Monaghan, supra note 28, at 1205 (“The Constitution is silent on what criteria the Senate should
use in giving ‘Advice and Consent’ . . . .”); Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1498 (“This
picture [of the Constitutional Convention] leaves something of a puzzle.”).
89. MADISON, supra note 71.
90. See id. at 67, 317 (declining to adopt James Wilson’s proposals to entrust the
appointment power solely to the executive).
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endorsed ideological considerations.” Gauch explains that “Equal
state representation meant that any inclusion of the Senate [in the
confirmation process] would necessarily involve accommodating
different views on states’ rights, and different views on states’ rights
91
represented political differences.” Additionally, proponents of the
assertive view point to the fact that nothing in the Constitution
prohibits the Senate from taking an aggressive posture in the
92
process.
Proponents of the assertive view can also find support in the
ratification debates: Madison seemingly acknowledged a role for the
93
Senate in Federalist No. 38. Comments made during state ratification
debates about the Senate’s ability to be actively involved in
confirming judges, such as Randolph’s statements in Virginia and
James McHenry’s comments in Maryland, also support the assertive
94
view.
Proponents of the assertive view can further rely on actions
taken by early Congresses as evidence supporting their view of advice
and consent. The Senate, for example, rejected John Rutledge’s
nomination to be Chief Justice largely because of Rutledge’s
95
opposition to the Jay Treaty. Likewise, senators challenged
nominees of Presidents Madison and John Quincy Adams, taking an
aggressive role in evaluating whether the nominees should sit on the
96
bench. These examples lead proponents of the assertive view to
claim that the original understanding of the Advice and Consent
Clause supports a robust role for the Senate in evaluating judicial

91. James E. Gauch, Comment, The Intended Role of the Senate in Supreme Court
Appointments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 357 (1989).
92. E.g., WITTES, supra note 7, at 128 (“Nothing in the Constitution forbids such an
aggressive posture, which the Senate remains free to assume at any time.”).
93. THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison); e.g., Matthew D. Marcotte, Advice and
Consent: A Historical Argument for Substantive Senatorial Involvement in Judicial Nominations,
5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 519, 533–35 (2002). In Federalist No. 38, Madison responds to
the objection that allowing the Senate to have a role in the confirmation of judges is a “vicious
part” of the Constitution. THE FEDERALIST NO. 38, at 232 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
94. E.g., Marcotte, supra note 93, at 533–35.
95. See Gauch, supra note 91, at 358–62 (discussing Rutledge’s nomination); Strauss &
Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1500 (“The Senate ultimately rejected Rutledge for political
reasons . . . .”).
96. Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1501 (noting the Senate’s assertiveness in the
nominations of Alexander Wolcott and Robert Trimble). Wolcott was rejected, and Trimble
was confirmed after a bitter battle in the Senate. ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 71–72, 75.
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nominees. Thus, these proponents claim, senators should be able to
consider a nominee’s ideological views when voting on the nominee,
just as the president can consider those views in choosing a nominee,
98
to determine if the nominee holds views that align with the senators’.
At the same time, the historical record also provides strong
support for the deferential view of advice and consent. The
Constitutional Convention explicitly rejected a prominent role for
Congress when it refused to give both legislative houses the power to
99
appoint judges, and the Convention likewise rejected such a role for
the Senate when it gave the president, rather than the Senate, the
100
power to nominate federal judges.
The preeminence of the
president’s role, proponents argue, is clear from the text of the
Advice and Consent Clause, which gives the president the exclusive
power to nominate judges and permits the Senate to give its consent
101
only after the nominee has been sent to the Senate.
The ratification debates also lend support to the deferential view.
102
According to Hamilton in Federalist No. 76, the Constitution vests
the power to nominate judges in one person because the Framers
103
believed that that structure would produce better judges, and the
Constitution provides for the Senate to be a check on those
nominations only “to prevent the appointment of unfit characters

97. See, e.g., Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1501 (claiming that “history support[s] an
independent role for the Senate in the confirmation process”).
98. Cf. Jeff Yates & William Gillespie, Essay, Supreme Court Power Play: Assessing the
Appropriate Role of the Senate in the Confirmation Process, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053, 1070
(2001) (claiming that a “vigorous institutional role for the Senate” is preferable because it keeps
the president from having too much power in selecting a nominee).
99. See MADISON, supra note 71, at 68 (changing the nomination power from one vested in
the entire Congress to one vested solely in the Senate); supra notes 71–87 and accompanying
text.
100. See MADISON, supra note 71, at 575 (recording the adoption of the Advice and Consent
Clause, which vests the power to nominate judges in the executive); supra notes 72–87 and
accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 194–95
(2005) (noting the far greater power that the Constitution gives the president in the nomination
process compared to the Senate); Eastman, supra note 21, at 640 (arguing that the president’s
sole power to nominate suggests that the Senate’s role in the confirmation process is
subordinate to the president’s role); McGinnis, supra note 40, at 642–43 (noting that the text of
the Advice and Consent Clause gives much greater authority to the president than to the
Senate).
102. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton).
103. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 93, at 455 (“The sole
and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more
exact regard to reputation.”).
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from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal
104
attachment, or from a view to popularity.” Proponents of the
deferential view also point to comments from other prominent
national leaders, such as James Wilson, who expressed deferential
105
views during the ratification debates. Similarly, James Iredell, the
future Supreme Court Justice, stated during the ratification debate in
North Carolina that “the Senate has no other influence but a restraint
106
on improper appointments.”
The early history of the Senate’s advice-and-consent role also
provides support for the deferential view. For instance, the rejection
of Rutledge’s nomination was based not only on his opposition to the
107
Jay Treaty but also on questions about his mental health. Thus,
although Rutledge’s ideological views appear to have played a role,
108
other factors were also involved, a fact that weakens the support the
failed Rutledge nomination gives to the assertive view. Furthermore,
other examples cited in support of the assertive view do not
necessarily show that disagreement with a nominee’s ideological
views is a sufficient ground for rejecting a nominee. Supreme Court
nominee Alexander Wolcott, for instance, was overwhelmingly
109
rejected because of “his extreme partisanship.” Even more powerful
support for this view comes from the relatively easy confirmations of
judicial nominees who had clear ideological views but who were
110
nonetheless overwhelmingly approved.
The history of the Founding era is thus ambiguous. It reveals no
clear original understanding of the Senate’s advice-and-consent role

104. Id. at 457.
105. See, e.g., Eastman, supra note 21, at 646–47 (explaining Wilson’s position on the
Senate’s narrow role in the confirmation process); Adam J. White, Toward the Framers’
Understanding of “Advice and Consent”: A Historical and Textual Inquiry, 29 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 103, 129–30 (2005) (discussing Wilson’s comments during the Pennsylvania
ratification debates).
106. Eastman, supra note 21, at 646 (quoting James Iredell, Debate in North Carolina
Ratifying Convention (July 28, 1788), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 102, 102
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)).
107. TIMOTHY L. HALL, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 20
(2001); Eastman, supra note 21, at 649.
108. See Eastman, supra note 21, at 649 (noting that “the Senate’s refusal to confirm
Rutledge might in part be due to questions about his mental stability”); David J. Garrow,
Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court: The Historical Case for a 28th Amendment, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 995, 1000 (2000) (noting Rutledge’s declining mental health).
109. ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 71–72.
110. Id. at 58–64 (noting the relative ease with which the majority of President Washington’s
Supreme Court nominees were confirmed, despite them having strong Federalist views).
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in the confirmation process, but instead provides proponents of both
the assertive view and the deferential view with arguments to support
111
their respective positions. Thus, given that proponents of each view
can make colorable arguments based on the historical record,
resolving the question of which view is more supported by original
understanding alone is difficult, if not impossible.
B. The Senate’s Approach to the Confirmation Process Throughout
American History
The history of judicial confirmations shows the use of both the
assertive and deferential views, and arguments based on historical
practice reflect the fact that history supports both views. On some
occasions, the Senate has opposed a nominee for overtly political
reasons. At other times, it has shown much more deference to the
president’s nominee. Moreover, the “process has changed much over
112
the last two centuries,” giving both sides opportunities to make
historical arguments. As with the debate over original understanding,
neither the deferential view nor the assertive view has a winning case
based solely on historical practice.
1. Nineteenth-Century Confirmations. The Senate has taken an
aggressive posture in many confirmation battles, even early in
American history, and proponents of the assertive view cite these
battles as support for their position. For instance, in the 1840s, the
113
Senate rejected five nominees of President Tyler.
President
Cleveland’s Supreme Court nomination of William Hornblower in
114
1893 had the same result. Such results were not uncommon in the
nineteenth century, when “the Senate rejected one out of every four
115
nominees for the Supreme Court.” These partisan rejections,
however, focused more on the political relationship between the
president and the Senate than on the ideology of the nominee.
President Tyler was essentially a president without a party, and many

111. Compare Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 25 (arguing for what this Note defines as the
assertive view), with McGinnis, supra note 40 (arguing for what this Note defines as the
deferential view). Both articles furnish ample historical evidence for their positions.
112. Ronald D. Rotunda, Innovations Disguised as Traditions: A Historical Review of the
Supreme Court Nominations Process, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 123, 123.
113. ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 85–86.
114. Id. at 114–15.
115. Gauch, supra note 91, at 337.
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senators, both Democrats and Whigs, were his political enemies.
And the rejection of President Cleveland’s nominee was spearheaded
by a New York senator who wanted President Cleveland to nominate
117
a different New Yorker to the Court.
Alternatively, proponents of the deferential view can point to the
easy confirmation of the majority of nominees with clear ideological
118
preferences. Furthermore, these proponents can distinguish the
Senate’s rejection of the nominees of Presidents Tyler and Cleveland
by noting that the political disputes at issue involved not the
nominee’s ideology, but rather battles between presidents and
119
senators over other political issues. Still, these examples undercut
Senator Graham’s historical arguments because senators during this
time period were basing their decisions on more than just a
combination of the nominees’ qualifications and the general
120
acceptability of the nominee’s views.
2. Early-Twentieth-Century Confirmations.
The judicial
nominations of the twentieth century also provide support for both
the deferential view and the assertive view. Proponents of the
assertive view can point to the Senate’s rejection of John Parker in
1930. Nominated for the Supreme Court by President Hoover, Parker
was a judge on the Fourth Circuit who faced bitter opposition from
121
the American Federation of Labor and the NAACP. Progressives
attacked Judge Parker’s record, claiming that he was racist and
hostile to organized labor; Parker was narrowly rejected by a 41 to 39
122
vote. Proponents of the assertive view claim that the Parker
nomination process was exactly like Robert Bork’s nomination
process in 1986, in which Bork’s views were evaluated and eventually
123
rejected by senators who disagreed with those views. Supporters of

116. See ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 85–86 (describing the opposition that President
Tyler’s nominees faced in the Senate because of the Senate’s hostility toward President Tyler).
117. See, e.g., id. at 114–15 (describing the animosity between President Cleveland and
Senator David B. Hill of New York).
118. See id. at 102–04 (noting that the Senate approved all of President Grant’s Supreme
Court nominees by large majorities).
119. See Eastman, supra note 21, at 649–51 (discussing the political nature of the
Jeffersonian Republicans’ efforts to impeach Justice Chase).
120. See supra note 46.
121. ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 32–33.
122. WITTES, supra note 7, at 50–53.
123. See id. at 51 (noting that the Parker confirmation fight “display[ed] almost all of the
elements of the later Bork fight”).
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the assertive view also point to Thurgood Marshall’s confirmation
hearings as an example of senators’ opposing a nominee based on
124
ideology. During the Marshall confirmation, Southern senators
treated Marshall very harshly and voted against him because of his
125
race and liberal views.
Meanwhile, other nominations during the twentieth century
support the deferential view. Proponents of this view can point to the
easy confirmations enjoyed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
record-setting nine Supreme Court nominees, all of whom were
126
widely regarded as liberal. G. Harold Carswell’s nomination by
President Nixon in 1970 also provides support for the deferential
view. Senators worried about the conservative Southerner’s extreme
127
views on civil rights. Even Carswell’s supporters admitted his
mediocre ability, which, when combined with his extreme views, led
128
the Senate to reject his nomination. The Bork nomination can also
support the deferential view. Although some senators undoubtedly
opposed Bork’s nomination because they disagreed with his views, his
nomination also drew opposition from well-respected Republican
senators, such as Senator Warner of Virginia, who considered Bork’s
129
views on constitutional law too extreme. According to this view of
the Bork nomination, the rejection was at least partly the result of
some senators’ adhering to the deferential view and refusing to
confirm a nominee with views that were widely considered far more
conservative than the mainstream of the nominee’s party.

124. See id. at 73 (discussing the opposition of Southern senators to Marshall’s nomination).
125. See ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 230 (noting that all but one of the votes against
Marshall’s nomination came from senators from the Deep South).
126. See id. at 163–87 (discussing President Roosevelt’s Supreme Court nominations).
127. See id. at 11 (noting Carswell’s stated commitment to “White Supremacy”). Of course,
attributing a rejection solely to the deferential view is difficult because senators can vote against
a nominee under either justification of the assertive view, whereas other senators may vote
against a nominee based on the deferential view. Nevertheless, at least some senators who voted
against Carswell, such as Senator Mathias, were adherents of the deferential view. See Mathias,
supra note 49, at 204 (describing Senator Mathias’s standard for evaluating judicial nominees).
128. See Warren Weaver Jr., Carswell Attacked and Defended as Senate Opens Debate on
Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1970, at 21 (noting that Senator Roman Hruska stated, in
support of Carswell’s nomination, that “mediocre judges and people and lawyers . . . . are
entitled to a little representation”).
129. See ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 281–83 (discussing the nomination of Robert Bork).
Although the rejection of the Bork nomination is often thought of as the quintessential example
of the assertive view in action, the opposition from Republican senators is perhaps more
illustrative of the deferential view. Senator Warner was an adherent of the deferential view. See
supra note 48.
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3. Confirmations in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras. Since the
130
1980s, senators have trended toward the assertive view. The
Clarence Thomas nomination is the iconic example of the assertive
view’s dominating the debate, as Thomas’s confirmation was a major
131
battle between conservatives and liberals. Alito, Sotomayor, and
132
Kagan all also faced partisan battles during their confirmations.
These confirmation battles have also affected circuit court and district
court nominations. The confirmation rates of nominees for lower
133
federal benches have dropped dramatically since 1980.
Still, the years of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts are not
lacking in examples of confirmations in which the Senate has
appeared to adhere to the deferential view. The nominations of
Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, for
example, lend support to the deferential view. Each nominee had
clear ideological views, yet the Senate confirmed all three nominees
134
by overwhelming margins. Thus, although partisan confirmation
battles have grown more common since the 1980s, the deferential
view has not been totally abandoned.
*

*

*

The historical record provides support for both the assertive view
and the deferential view. Although proponents of each view can
make a strong case based on this record, neither side can make a
135
persuasive case because of the counterarguments on the other side.
130. See Rotunda, supra note 112, at 130–31 (claiming that by the 1990s the process had
changed and the Senate had become more assertive in the confirmation process).
131. See, e.g., LEWIS L. GOULD, THE MOST EXCLUSIVE CLUB: A HISTORY OF THE
MODERN UNITED STATES SENATE 296–98 (2005) (discussing the partisanship of the Thomas
hearings). Although the Thomas nomination could be representative of the deferential view, the
circus-like atmosphere of the hearings made this nomination more of an example of an assertive
Senate trying to examine a nominee aggressively.
132. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text.
133. See SARAH A. BINDER & FORREST MALTZMAN, ADVICE & DISSENT: THE STRUGGLE
TO SHAPE THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3 fig.1-1 (2009) (providing a graph with the confirmation
rates for circuit court and district court judges between 1947 and 2008).
134. See ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 278–79, 305–06, 311–12 (discussing the relatively easy
confirmations of Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer). Although Chief Justice Roberts faced
some opposition, his confirmation was still relatively easy. See Charles Babington & Peter
Baker, Roberts Confirmed as 17th Chief Justice, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2005, at A1 (discussing
Chief Justice Roberts’s confirmation).
135. The Senate’s varied approach to the confirmation of judges demonstrates the influence
of political cycles on the confirmation process. See Monaghan, supra note 28, at 1208 (“The
Senate’s actual role in the confirmation process depended upon the shifting balance of political
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Therefore, the debate over the Senate’s role in the confirmation
process remains unresolved. Given history’s failure to end the
discussion, scholars often turn to another ground for deciding what
the Senate’s role in the confirmation process should be.
III. THE VALUES INVOLVED IN THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS
The arguments focusing on the original understanding of the
Advice and Consent Clause and historical practice fail to resolve the
debate over the Senate’s proper role in the confirmation process.
Thus, the debate often shifts to the question of which view better
achieves the purposes of Senate confirmation of judicial nominees.
Scholars have identified certain values that define the battlefield on
which these debates are held. Among these values are judicial
independence, judicial accountability, respect for the rule of law, the
need for talented legal minds to want to become federal judges, and
136
social cohesion. This Part sets out these values and considers the
137
extent to which each view serves them. Like the debates over the

power between Congress and the President.”). See generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE
POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON (1997)
(describing the cyclical pattern of the strength of presidential leadership). Senators are more
willing to challenge the president when the president is politically weak at the time of a
nomination, and senators are forced by political reality to defer to a president who is enjoying
great popularity at the time of a nomination. Still, some senators have stuck to a particular
approach despite the political climate. For example, despite President Obama’s relatively high
popularity during the Sotomayor nomination, see Daily Presidential Tracking Poll, RASMUSSEN
REP. (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/obama_
administration/daily_presidential_tracking_poll, some Republican senators were still eager to
challenge the president’s nominee, see Meet the Press, supra note 20. Even if political cycles
explain some of how the Senate has changed over time, these cycles do not truly explain why
senators adhere to one view rather than the other.
136. For a few examples of sources that base their arguments on these values, whether
explicitly or implicitly, see Viet D. Dinh, Threats to Judicial Independence, Real and Imagined,
95 GEO. L.J. 929, 937 (2007); Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection
and Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 974 (2007); Mathias, supra note 49, at 205;
Stephen B. Presser, Judicial Ideology and the Survival of the Rule of Law: A Field Guide to the
Current Political War over the Judiciary, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 427, 433–36 (2008); Carl W.
Tobias, Postpartisan Federal Judicial Selection, 51 B.C. L. REV. 769, 791–94 (2010); Brent Wible,
Filibuster vs. Supermajority Rule: From Polarization to a Consensus- and Moderation-Forcing
Mechanism for Judicial Confirmations, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 923, 935 (2005); and Elena
Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 939–40 (1995) (book
review).
137. This Part and Part IV focus more on the complete-distinction justification of the
assertive view because that is the view that is most often invoked by senators. Nevertheless, as
noted in Part I.A.2, senators also discuss the no-distinction justification to illustrate the
differences between these justifications.
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original understanding of advice and consent and historical practice,
the debates over these values fail to focus on the underlying
disagreement between proponents of the assertive and deferential
views. These debates help reveal this underlying disagreement, but
they focus only on a result of that disagreement.
A. Judicial Independence
The independence of the federal judiciary is a feature of
American constitutionalism that has drawn praise and respect from
138
across the political spectrum. An independent judiciary is one in
which judges are free from outside influences, including influence by
the other branches of government, so that they can make decisions
139
based solely on the facts and law in each case. The need for judicial
140
independence is now widely accepted, and it is considered “one of
141
this Nation’s outstanding characteristics.” Hamilton’s defense of an
142
independent judiciary in Federalist No. 78 remains a leading
argument on the subject. Hamilton’s two primary reasons for favoring
an independent judiciary were to ensure the ability of the courts to
enforce constitutional limitations on the powers of the political
143
branches and to protect the rights of minorities against tyrannical
144
majorities. Judicial independence is fostered by the constitutional

138. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 7879–86 (2005) (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.)
(stressing the need for judicial independence); 149 CONG. REC. 28,857 (2003) (statement of Sen.
Bill Frist) (“[T]he Senate stewardship of the independent judiciary is perhaps the Senate’s most
important task.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 93, at 466 (“The
complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited
Constitution.”).
139. Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
315, 320 (1999).
140. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982)
(plurality opinion) (“The Federal Judiciary was therefore designed by the Framers to stand
independent of the Executive and Legislature—to maintain the checks and balances of the
constitutional structure, and also to guarantee that the process of adjudication itself remained
impartial.”); Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 84 (1970) (“There
can, of course, be no disagreement among us as to the imperative need for total and absolute
independence of judges in deciding cases or in any phase of the decisional function.”); Burbank,
supra note 139, at 341 (“It was also [the Framers’] view that judicial independence was
instrumental to the resolution of ordinary cases according to law.”); Strauss & Sunstein, supra
note 25, at 1504 (“To be sure, the Supreme Court is supposed to be independent . . . .”).
141. Chandler, 398 U.S. at 136 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
142. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
143. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 93, at 465–66.
144. Id. at 470 (noting that only independent courts can protect “particular classes of
citizens [from] . . . unjust and partial laws”).
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and
provisions providing for tenure during good behavior
146
prohibiting the reduction of judges’ salaries. Additionally, the
Supreme Court has garnered a strong and enduring respect among
the public, which has come to accept the federal courts’ need for
147
independence from the political branches.
Judicial independence can exist in two ways: actual
148
independence and perceived independence.
Actual judicial
independence involves the postconfirmation relationship between the
149
courts and the other branches. Thus, a judge can be independent
once confirmed if the Senate does not try to influence the outcomes
of his cases, regardless of whether confirming senators have
aggressively inquired into his ideology or deferred to a broad range of
150
generally accepted views during his confirmation. Perceived judicial
independence is the public’s perception of whether judges are able to
151
make decisions free from the influence of the political branches.
The confirmation process can have the most pronounced effect on
perceived independence.

145. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behavior . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton), supra note 93, at 470–71 (“That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the
Constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice,
can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary commission.”).
146. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, . . . shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander
Hamilton), supra note 93, at 471 (arguing that the constitutional prohibition on reducing judges’
salaries “is the most eligible provision that could have been devised” to protect judicial
independence).
147. See WITTES, supra note 7, at 103–04 (describing how the Court has helped promote its
independence through means beyond the explicit protections of the judiciary in the
Constitution). Compare Topics at a Glance: The Supreme Court, ROPER CTR., http://www.
ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/tag/the_supreme_court.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012)
(providing polling data on the public’s opinion of the Supreme Court), with RealClearPolitics
Poll Averages, REALCLEARPOLITICS, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/polls (last visited Feb.
14, 2012) (averaging the results of multiple polls on the approval ratings of both President
Obama and Congress).
148. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 279
(2008) (recognizing the difference between actual and perceived judicial independence).
149. See Burbank, supra note 139, at 336 (discussing the role of judicial independence in the
American constitutional system).
150. See Erwin Chemerinksy, Evaluating Judicial Candidates, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1985, 1990
(1988) (noting that judges should be “insulated” from politics once they are on the bench).
151. See O’BRIEN, supra note 27, at 330 (“The Court’s prestige rests on preserving the
public’s view that justices base their decisions on interpretations of the law, rather than on their
personal policy preferences.”).
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For proponents of the complete-distinction justification of the
assertive view, the clear line between law and politics requires that
senators inquire into a nominee’s views to ensure that those views
align with the senators’ own views of the law. Thus, for example,
Senator Sessions noted that he would inquire into Sotomayor’s
ideological views to ensure that her views aligned with Senator
152
Sessions’s understanding of the law. By inquiring into a nominee’s
views, senators can ensure that judges do not have views that will
impermissibly influence their decisions and lead to decisions contrary
153
to established precedent. Although the depth and pointedness of
senators’ questions associated with this inquiry may cause judges to
154
appear less independent, the inquiry is necessary to protect the clear
155
line between politics and law. By having senators inquire into
nominees’ views, the public can trust that only those nominees who
will uphold the law will sit on the bench.
Meanwhile, according to the no-distinction justification of the
assertive view, senators should intensely scrutinize nominees’ views in
an attempt to influence the development of the law by voting to
156
confirm only nominees who share their ideological views. Under
this justification, the appearance of independence is far less important
because the law is shaped by the views of those judges who sit on the
bench and because knowing what nominees believe is essential to
knowing how they will decide cases. Judges can still have actual
independence to decide particular cases, but they need not appear
independent or isolated from the political process because, according
to this view, the law is not independent or isolated from politics.
Proponents of the deferential view can argue that their view
provides a much greater appearance of independence. Although the
157
president may choose a nominee based on ideology, the president’s
use of ideology is not as obvious as the Senate’s use of ideology
because the president does not have to discuss any political

152. See supra note 15.
153. For a discussion of the assertive view’s focus on preventing judges from basing
decisions on their ideological beliefs rather than the law, see supra notes 20, 23 and
accompanying text.
154. See O’Scannlain, supra note 21, at 174 (claiming that aggressive questioning of judicial
nominees “threatens to erode” judicial independence).
155. See supra notes 20, 32 and accompanying text.
156. See generally SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 22 (arguing that people are generally aware
that judges’ decisions are influenced by their personal views).
157. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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motivations behind the selection. Whereas the assertive view’s use
of ideology puts the ideological positions of nominees squarely in the
public eye, the deferential view does not usually emphasize a
159
nominee’s specific positions on controversial issues. The deferential
view accepts that some degree of judicial discretion exists due to the
underdeterminacy of law. It seeks to give judges room to exercise that
discretion without forcing them to disclose their views on extremely
controversial issues that would divide the public during the
confirmation process and will be likely to become the focus of high160
profile cases.
B. Judicial Accountability
Another value reflected in the confirmation process is judicial
accountability. Because democracy is rooted in the idea that the
people have the ultimate authority, affording judges lifetime tenure
161
can pose serious threats to democratic legitimacy.
Judicial
accountability sits in tension with judicial independence because a
judiciary that must constantly answer to public opinion cannot be
sufficiently free to make decisions based on law rather than on
162
popular opinion. At the same time, the public is unlikely to support
independence for a judiciary that seems completely detached from
the real world.

158. For instance, presidents do not have to make the type of statements that senators who
adhere to the assertive view make during hearings. See, e.g., supra note 15.
159. The practical distinction between these views was evident in the different approaches
to questioning Kagan. See Stuart Taylor Jr., Graham, the Gentleman, at Kagan Hearings, THE
DAILY BEAST (June 29, 2010, 2:30 PM EDT), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/
2010/06/29/graham-the-gentleman-at-kagan-hearings.html (contrasting Senator Graham, who
maintained a “good-natured dialogue” with Kagan, with the “other senators of both parties who
doggedly pressed Kagan to agree with their views”).
160. See Bruce Fein, Commentary, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 672, 687 (1989) (arguing that an assertive Senate will weaken the judiciary); Jackson,
supra note 136, at 982–83 (asserting that some limits constrain the questions that senators are
willing to ask during confirmation hearings).
161. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (1962) (discussing the countermajoritarian nature of the
judiciary).
162. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Essay, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2168, 2171
(2006) (“While independence frees judges to make unpopular decisions, lack of accountability
may at the same time free them to make erroneous decisions. However, the more we hold
judges accountable, whether to the political branches, the public, or both, the less independence
judges will enjoy.”).
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The realization that the judiciary is not as weak or as
163
uninfluential as it was originally imagined to be has given rise to
serious concerns about how federal judges can be held accountable to
164
165
In Federalist No. 79,
Hamilton argued that
the public.
impeachment would be a sufficient check on judges and would
166
provide all the accountability that would be necessary.
Impeachment of federal judges, however, has been an infrequent
167
occurrence, and now it is invoked only for criminal behavior.
Realistically, the best way for the political branches to hold the
168
judiciary accountable is through the confirmation process.
Both national accountability and local accountability inhere in
the confirmation process. First, national accountability exists through
169
the president. As the only nationally elected official, the president
163. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 93, at 465–66
(claiming that the judiciary “ha[s] neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment” and “is
beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments”), with O’Scannlain, supra note 21, at
171–72 (arguing that the judiciary is far more powerful than the Founders believed it would be.
164. See BICKEL, supra note 161, at 16–23 (discussing the inherent tension in a democracy
between the will of the majority and the ability of the unelected judiciary to overrule the
majority).
165. THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander Hamilton).
166. THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 93, at 474 (“[The
Impeachment Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4,] is the only provision on the point which is
consistent with the necessary independence of the judicial character, and is the only one which
we find in our own Constitution in respect to our own judges.”).
167. See Burbank, supra note 139, at 340 (“[T]he impeachment article has become a virtual
dead letter for [holding judges accountable for their decisions] . . . .”); History of the Federal
Judiciary: Impeachments of Federal Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/
home.nsf/page/judges_impeachments.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (providing a list of the
fifteen impeached federal judges).
168. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution,
87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066–88 (2001) (describing the theory of partisan entrenchment and noting
that “[federal] judges—and particularly Supreme Court Justices—tend to reflect the vector sum
of political forces at the time of their confirmation”); O’Scannlain, supra note 21, at 171 (“[T]he
primary means by which the political branches exert control over an otherwise insulated federal
judiciary—especially during the last decade and a half—has been the confirmation process.”);
Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 1504 (describing how nomination by the president and
confirmation by the Senate provide a political check on the federal judiciary). Since George
Washington’s presidency, presidents have recognized the importance of the power to nominate
federal judges. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 10 (tracing the history of Supreme Court
nominations). The nomination process has generally provided meaningful accountability by
permitting public opinion to influence who sits on the federal bench. See WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 210 (new ed. 2001) (arguing that the confirmation process
allows “the public will” to shape the federal judiciary).
169. Scholars and senators generally agree that the president nominates people for the
federal bench who substantially share his ideological commitments. Therefore, when voters
choose one presidential candidate over another, they are by implication favoring one type of
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selects a nominee whom the president, and presumably many of the
president’s supporters, believe to be qualified and to possess the
170
desired ideological views. Thus, presidential nomination provides
some judicial accountability at the national level. Second, the senators
who must confirm or reject the nominee each represent the views of
one of the fifty states, so when senators vote on a nominee, they hold
the judiciary accountable on a more local level.
The assertive view and the deferential view provide
accountability to different degrees and in different ways. The
assertive view provides a type of double accountability. By
considering a nominee’s ideological views to the same extent as the
president, senators provide a second check in the confirmation
171
process. This check is necessary under both justifications for the
assertive view. For the complete-distinction justification, exercising
this second form of accountability is important because it provides
senators with a chance to ensure that judges base their decisions on
the law rather than on their own views. For example, senators
adhering to the assertive view regularly ask nominees about abortion
because those senators have clear beliefs about what the Constitution
172
requires the law on abortion to be. This inquiry can help a senator
know whether a nominee will base decisions on what the law is—or
on what the senator believes the Constitution requires the law to be—
173
rather than on what the nominee wants the law to be. For the nojudge over another. For detailed explanations of these ideas, see generally ABRAHAM, supra
note 10, which traces the history of judicial nominations and the criteria used by presidents in
making those nominations; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 22, which uses decisions by judges to
demonstrate a shared ideology with the presidents who nominated them; and Robert A. Dahl,
Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L.
279 (1957), which discusses how the Supreme Court reflects popular opinion.
170. See supra note 23.
171. A potential problem is that, due to the Senate’s structure of equal representation for all
states, a bloc of senators from small states who object to a nominee’s ideological views could
thwart the will of the majority of the country. See LARRY J. SABATO, A MORE PERFECT
CONSTITUTION: 23 PROPOSALS TO REVITALIZE OUR CONSTITUTION AND MAKE AMERICA A
FAIRER COUNTRY 25 (2007) (explaining that the Senate’s structure permits a small portion of
the nation’s population to block the majority’s will).
172. See, e.g., Editorial, Judge Alito on Abortion, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2005, at A20 (noting
the importance to senators of Alito’s views on abortion); Sotomayor Deflects Questions on
Abortion, MSNBC.COM (July 15, 2009, 7:17 PM ET), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31917681/
ns/politics-supreme_court/t/sotomayor-deflects-questions-abortion
(describing
Republican
senators’ questions to Sotomayor on abortion).
173. See Emery G. Lee III, The Federalist in an Age of Faction: Rethinking Federalist No. 76
on the Senate’s Role in the Judicial Confirmations Process, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 235, 238–39
(2004) (summarizing common arguments in support of the position that the assertive view
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distinction justification, a focus on the nominee’s ideological views
provides an opportunity to influence the development of the law.
Because judges are essentially unaccountable once they are
confirmed, the confirmation process provides a chance for senators to
try to keep off the bench those nominees who have views with which
174
they strongly disagree.
According to proponents of the deferential view, presidential
nomination of judges provides sufficient accountability in the
confirmation process because the president represents the entire
175
nation. Although this form of accountability is not as strong as the
accountability that the assertive view would provide, adherents of the
deferential view find their position sufficient because it provides a
degree of accountability while still allowing enough independence for
judges to make decisions without appearing to bend to the political
176
views of the people who nominated and confirmed them. This
careful balance between accountability and independence is desirable
to give judges the necessary room to decide cases. The political
process exerts some influence, but judicial reasoning also plays a role
in the development of the law. Proponents of this view argue that it
seeks to maintain a balance between judicial accountability and
independence that is appropriate in a democracy while
177
simultaneously appreciating the underdeterminacy of law.

provides greater accountability for federal judges because nominees’ ideological commitments
are tested and can be rejected by the Senate).
174. Cf. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Filibustering Judicial
Nominations, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 337 (2005) (defending the filibuster as a means of
checking judicial power).
175. See, e.g., Eastman, supra note 21, at 645 (discussing the president’s power to nominate
federal judges); see also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 711 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(“[The president] (along with his constitutionally subordinate Vice President) is the only official
for whom the entire Nation votes, and is the only elected officer to represent the entire Nation
both domestically and abroad.”); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934) (“The
importance of [the president’s] election and the vital character of its relationship to and effect
upon the welfare and safety of the whole people cannot be too strongly stated.”).
176. See Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Lindsey O. Graham,
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (providing Senator Graham’s evaluation of judicial
accountability and independence).
177. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
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C. Respect for the Rule of Law
Society’s respect for the rule of law is essential for a nation to
178
sustain its democratic structure. The rule of law exists when a nation
is governed by “fixed and publicly known [laws] . . . , so that those
applying the law, as much as those to whom it is applied, can be
179
bound by it.” The rule of law embodies values such as consistency,
180
stability, predictability, and transparency.
As with judicial independence, the fact and the appearance of
the rule of law are not identical. Although the two often coexist, one
can exist without the other. Because society’s respect for the rule of
law can be based only on collective perceptions, the appearance of
the rule of law is the more important aspect. Society will maintain
respect for the rule of law if people believe that judges make
decisions based on promulgated rules and free from political
considerations, interpreting the law based on an honest legal
judgment and applying that judgment to the facts of each case.
Without this understanding, the values embodied in the rule of law
181
begin to fade, and their benefits are lost.
182
“[T]he rule of law is not self-sustaining,” so political leaders,
including senators in the process of confirming judges, must be
careful to ensure that their actions do not undermine the appearance
of the rule of law. The Constitution provides the process for

178. See, e.g., LARRY DIAMOND, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRACY: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD
FREE SOCIETIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 21 (2008) (“A country cannot be a democracy if
there is . . . no rule of law.”); Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of
Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1307 (2001) (“The rule of law is a
cornerstone of contemporary constitutional democracy . . . .”); Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of
Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 966 (2008) (arguing that the rule of law can only be
sustained by a culture that values it); cf. ROBERT D. PUTNAM WITH ROBERT LEONARDI &
RAFFAELLA Y. NANETTI, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN
ITALY 181–85 (1993) (studying the differences between northern and southern Italy to
demonstrate that a certain culture is necessary for a democratic society to exist).
179. Robert H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1997).
180. Siegel, supra note 178, at 966–67. For early and influential works describing the need
for the rule of law, see generally LOCKE, supra note 14; and SAMUEL RUTHERFORD, LEX, REX
(1644).
181. See Siegel, supra note 178, at 967 (“If members of a political community experienced
the law as deeply alienating over an extended period of time, they would inevitably feel a
diminished sense of obligation to obey the law.”).
182. Id. at 966.
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183

appointing federal judges, but the actions and statements of the
participants in the process shape public perceptions of the rule of law
and of the federal courts more broadly. Although the growth of legal
realism shattered any notion that the law is “a brooding
184
omnipresence in the sky,” cases should, at the very least, appear to
be decided based on accepted methods of legal reasoning instead of
185
the personal preferences of judges. Because the judges who apply
the law and decide cases claim their seats on the bench through the
confirmation process, the process must promote the legitimacy of
these judges as fair, impartial adjudicators.
For the complete-distinction justification of the assertive view,
respect for the rule of law is maintained when judges make decisions
based on clearly established rules and without considering their
personal views. Advocates of this justification are likely to believe
that the aggressive questioning of nominees during the confirmation
process will ensure that no judge holds views contrary to the law that
186
will influence the judge’s decisions. As a result, society will be able
to respect the rule of law knowing that it is based on established legal
rules, not on judicial biases. Alternatively, the no-distinction
justification provides respect for the rule of law by ensuring that
judges who sit on the bench reflect popular opinion. Presumably,
judges whose views reflect popular opinion will decide cases
reflecting that opinion. When decisions reflect popular opinion, the
public is more likely to respect those decisions and abide by them.
By contrast, the belief that the law is underdetermined leads
proponents of the deferential view to argue that respect for the rule
of law is preserved when judges make decisions based on accepted
forms of legal reasoning, even if the judges’ own views color their
187
analyses to some extent. Recognizing that the law is molded by

183. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The president] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States . . . .”).
184. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
185. See Rosenfeld, supra note 178, at 1340 (“[T]he rule of law in the narrow sense appears
to insure a significant amount of legality and the promotion of legal norms that do not stray too
far from the well of commonly accepted values.”).
186. If judges’ views were to influence their decisions, then judges with views contrary to the
law would be likely to issue decisions that were not based on the established law. See supra note
23 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 185 and accompanying text; cf. Janet Adamy, Court Strikes at Health
Law, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2010, at A1 (emphasizing that a Republican president nominated the
judge who struck down part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
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society’s experiences and by who sits on the bench, adherents of the
deferential view seek to promote respect for the rule of law by
confirming judges with reasonable views. Although the individuals
confirmed as federal judges are likely to affect the outcomes of cases,
adherents of the deferential view accept the reality that elections have
188
consequences. These adherents seek to preserve the distinction
between law and politics while still accommodating the ways that
189
politics influences the law’s development. The requirement that
nominees hold reasonable views ensures that the law will not venture
outside the mainstream, so that the public will be able to accept and
190
respect the law.
D. The Need for Qualified Jurists
Society needs and should want smart, capable judges sitting on
191
the federal bench. Federal courts handle thousands of cases every
192
deciding important questions that affect the rights of
year,
individuals and providing answers that set forth many of the rules that
193
govern society. The power held by federal judges necessitates
intelligent, fair judges who can discern the law and equities in every
194
case and apply the law impartially.
148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42
U.S.C.), and that a Democratic president had nominated the judges who upheld the Act’s
constitutionality).
188. See Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Lindsey O. Graham,
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting the Senate’s “obligation to honor . . . [and] respect
elections” in the confirmation process).
189. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
190. No bright line exists between the belief that the law is underdetermined and the belief
that it is indeterminate; rather, the distinction is a matter of degree. Wherever the distinction
between these positions falls, the deferential view’s requirement of mainstream nominees
distinguishes its conception of law and politics from the conception of law and politics
underlying the no-distinction justification of the assertive view.
191. See Siegel, supra note 178, at 980 (noting that federal judges “must not only be good
citizens and men of education and integrity . . . but must also be statesmen” (quoting ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 150 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans.,
Anchor Books 1969) (1835))).
192. See generally ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS: 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR (2010), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf
(summarizing the caseload of federal courts).
193. See generally Wallace Mendelson, The Judge’s Art, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 524 (1961)
(discussing the nature of a judge’s work).
194. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (“All judges take an oath to uphold the Constitution and apply the law
impartially . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 93, at 471
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This need for good judges leads to several conclusions. First,
America’s best legal minds should be encouraged to sit on the federal
195
bench. Lifetime tenure makes the federal bench an appealing job. A
federal judgeship should not be made less appealing because of an
196
acrimonious confirmation process. Instead, nominees should be able
to expect a confirmation process that is professional, informative, and
probative of the nominee in a way that meaningfully determines
whether the nominee would make a good judge.
Second, the confirmation process must focus on putting qualified
individuals on the bench. The Senate should block any judge who
197
would fail to meet the expectations for federal judges because those
198
judges have a lifetime appointment and few methods exist to bind
199
judges once they are on the bench. Thus, the Senate’s examination
of a nominee’s substantive views should be done in a meaningful and
informative way. Senators should ask serious questions to learn about

(“[T]here can be but few men in the society who will have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify
them for the stations of judges.”).
195. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”). Judicial salaries, although protected, are
much lower than what most judges would make in private practice, so the protection of salaries
is not a great enticement for lawyers to become judges. See, e.g., JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2006
YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7 (2007), available at http://www.supreme
court.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2006year-endreport.pdf (“Our judiciary will not properly serve its
constitutional role if it is restricted to (1) persons so wealthy that they can afford to be
indifferent to the level of judicial compensation, or (2) people for whom the judicial salary
represents a pay increase.”).
196. See, e.g., WITTES, supra note 7, at 88 (describing how Miguel Estrada refused to be
considered for the Supreme Court vacancy created by Justice O’Connor’s retirement because of
his negative experience as a failed nominee for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit).
197. Admittedly, these expectations are difficult to articulate. Perhaps more helpful for
understanding what makes a good judge is studying what makes a bad judge. See Geoffrey P.
Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 431 (2004) (describing bad judges as those jurists “who
are incompetent, self-indulgent, abusive, or corrupt”).
198. For a discussion of the impeachment of federal judges, see supra notes 167, 195 and
accompanying text.
199. One such approach could be limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts. See U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2 (permitting Congress to make certain exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (“[H]aving a right to prescribe,
Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated
controversies.”). This approach, however, has its limits. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct.
2229, 2240 (2008) (invalidating the provision of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42
U.S.C.), which suspended habeas corpus). See generally Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and
Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359
(1975) (describing the challenges of trying to limit the discretion of judges).
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how a nominee would approach the job of judging and the duty of
200
deciding cases. Ultimately, the confirmation process can ensure that
qualified judges are installed if it is fair and not so acrimonious as to
discourage good nominees from being willing to go through the
process.
Under either the complete-distinction justification or the nodistinction justification, the assertive view is more likely to create an
acrimonious process. Nevertheless, proponents of both justifications
are likely to view this cost as necessary. Under the completedistinction justification, judges’ views must conform to the law, so
senators must inquire into a nominee’s views. Under the nodistinction justification, a senator must inquire into the nominee’s
views to determine whether the nominee shares the senator’s views.
The process is likely to be far more hostile when senators aggressively
question a nominee about the nominee’s views on controversial
issues, a phenomenon occurs when senators follow either justification
of the assertive view and focus intensely on the nominee’s ideological
201
views. A burdensome confirmation process, particularly one that is
personally wearisome, is likely to drive away some potential
202
nominees, but for proponents of either justification of the assertive
view, this cost is necessary.
Under the deferential view, senators are still free to examine the
nominee’s ideological views, but doing so is necessary only to ensure
that the nominee holds reasonable positions and to understand the
203
nominee’s views on a judge’s role. Still, these questions are likely to

200. If senators have serious questions about a nominee’s personal conduct or concerns
about ethics charges against a nominee, they should ask those questions. Senators should not,
however, trump up charges against a nominee because of ideological opposition, as Senator
Kennedy was accused of doing against Alito. See Byron York, Alito and the Ted Kennedy
“Study,” NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Jan. 9, 2006, 1:54 PM), http://old.nationalreview.com/york/york
200601091354.asp (decrying as spurious Senator Kennedy’s claims that Alito’s dissents on the
Third Circuit were hostile to individual rights).
201. See, e.g., Senate GOP Questions Sotomayor’s Stances, MSNBC.COM (June 24, 2009, 7:38
AM ET), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31508311/ns/politics-capitol_hill (discussing Republican
attacks on Sotomayor). This process can, unsurprisingly, be difficult for a nominee and a
nominee’s family to bear. See, e.g., CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR
266 (2007) (“I had only one last doubt in my mind [about the confirmation process]: I didn’t
know how much more of a beating [my wife] and I could take.”); Rotunda, supra note 112, at
131 (“[S]ome first-class nominees may refuse to be considered because they do not wish to
endure the gauntlet of being subjected to unfair flyspecking of one’s career.”).
202. See supra note 196.
203. The proper role of a judge is hard to define. Kagan gave an apt description of the
judge’s role during her confirmation hearings, explaining that judges should respect the political
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be far less hostile because a senator need only determine that the
nominee does not hold extreme views and need not push the nominee
204
to agree or disagree with a specific position. The process may not be
easy for nominees under the deferential view, but the it not as
personally burdensome as proponents of the assertive view might
make it.
E. Social Cohesion
A cohesive society is one in which citizens coexist peaceably
despite any disagreements they might have on various issues.
America is a nation of people who hold widely divergent views on
many issues. In a pluralistic society, citizens must adhere to some
overarching values that bind them together, no matter their other
205
disagreements. In the United States, social cohesion is premised on
a shared reverence for life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the
206
equality of all people under the law. Although these values are
broad and somewhat amorphous, they underlie senators’
207
conversations about judicial nominations. These values can be
interpreted in many different ways, but, ultimately, a good
confirmation process will promote social cohesion by reinforcing
society’s common bonds rather than sharpening its cleavages.
By focusing on a nominee’s ideological views, the assertive view
often highlights the issues that matter most to the public. Senators
raise the controversial issues that dominate public attention and that

branches, adhere to precedent, and decide cases narrowly. The Nomination of Elena Kagan To
Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 266 (2010) (statement of Elena Kagan).
204. Cf. Fein, supra note 160, at 687 (arguing that an assertive Senate will drive away
otherwise-qualified nominees). For an explanation of the difference in the tenor of senators’
questioning under each view, see supra note 159.
205. See Rosenfeld, supra note 178, at 1310 (“[I]n heterogeneous societies with various
competing conceptions of the good, constitutional democracy and adherence to the rule of law
may well be indispensable to achieving political cohesion with minimum oppression.”).
206. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths
to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”).
See generally THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 46 (Belknap Press 2010) (1776) (encouraging
Americans to rally behind a common cause). Of course, scholars can vehemently disagree about
how these values should shape society. Still, these values provide a foundation for people with
different ideologies to live amongst each other with a common understanding.
207. See, e.g., Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Lindsey O.
Graham, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (implicating many of these values in discussing
Senator Graham’s support for Kagan’s nomination).
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208

lead to the most divisive cases. Under the complete-distinction
justification, senators ask nominees about their views on these issues
to determine whether the nominees would decide cases contrary to
what the senators believe the law is. Thus, this justification promotes
social cohesion by allowing senators to protect the law from politics
through a focus on substantive issues. Under the no-distinction
justification, however, senators ask questions about controversial
issues because they want to confirm only the nominees with whom
209
they agree. Although these issues generate controversy, proponents
of this justification of the assertive view treat the law as another
means of achieving a certain result, so they have no reason to
emphasize an empty hope of social cohesion ahead of their policy
210
goals.
Meanwhile, the deferential view promotes social cohesion by
deemphasizing society’s sharpest disagreements. By taking a broader
view of a nominee’s ideology, the deferential view allows the
confirmation process to underscore the common bonds of Americans
and the respected role of the federal courts in America’s
constitutional system. By acknowledging the legitimacy of different
ideological views during the confirmation process, the deferential
211
view promotes unity and a sense of respect. It also helps keep the
confirmation process from becoming a major political battle. In a
212
time of great partisanship,
the deferential view provides an
opportunity for the Senate to focus on points of agreement and

208. One such controversial issue is abortion. Senators regularly prod nominees about their
views on abortion and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See supra notes 26, 172.
209. See, e.g., Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Turnabout, U.S. Says Marriage Act
Blocks Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011, at A1 (discussing the controversy surrounding the
Obama administration’s decision not to defend the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)), in
court); Jennifer Steinhauer, Under Banner of Fiscal Restraint, Republicans Plan New Abortion
Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011, at A18 (describing the controversy over proposed abortion
restrictions).
210. See Gauch, supra note 91, at 364 (“If political dealing is inevitable, we should recognize
it as such or we will only further obscure the real issues.”).
211. Cf. 151 CONG. REC. 7875–76 (2005) (statement of Sen. James M. Talent) (describing
the “divisive” results when senators attack nominees solely because of ideological
disagreements).
212. See, e.g., Dan Balz, Bayh’s Criticism of Congress: Overstated or Spot-On?, WASH. POST,
Feb. 17, 2010, at A1 (discussing the partisanship in Congress).
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provides a refreshing break from its normal political fighting. The
deferential view also seeks to protect democracy, which can become
fragile if the tensions within a country are too strained.
IV. CLARIFYING THE UNDERLYING DEBATE BETWEEN THE
COMPETING VIEWS OF ADVICE AND CONSENT
Although the values in Part III often provide the battlefield for
proponents of the assertive view and the deferential view in the
debate over the Senate’s role in the confirmation process, discussion
of these values ultimately does not resolve the question of which
approach is better. Instead, they only reveal a deeper disagreement
between proponents of these views. Fundamentally, the assertive
view and the deferential view face a stark divide in their conceptions
of the relationship between law and politics. This Part discusses this
more fundamental disagreement about the confirmation process. This
disagreement manifests in two ways: in senators’ comments about and
during judicial confirmations and in commentators’ and scholars’
arguments about which approach is better.
First, senators’ own comments reveal their underlying
assumptions about the relationship between law and politics. On the
one hand, Senators Sessions and Leahy and then-Senator Joseph
Biden have all noted that they would inquire carefully into nominees’
214
ideological views.
Each senator’s statement suggested that a
nominee whose political views did not align with accepted law would
not be fit for the bench because the senators feared that such a
215
nominee would decide cases contrary to the law. Implicitly, these
senators were saying that law and politics are separate and that judges
should never let their political views influence their legal decisions.
Senator Graham, on the other hand, openly stated his view of the
relationship between law and politics during the Sotomayor and
216
Kagan confirmation hearings. Although he recognized that a
217
“difference between politics and the law” exists, he nevertheless
213. Cf. Dana Milbank, One of These Senators Is Not Like the Other, WASH. POST, July 21,
2010, at A2 (claiming that Senator Graham “believe[s] there are bigger things than politics” and
that he “towers above his Senate Republican colleagues”).
214. See supra note 15.
215. See supra note 15.
216. E.g., Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Graham, Member, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary); Graham, supra note 18.
217. Executive Business Meeting, supra note 2 (statement of Sen. Graham, Member, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary).
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admitted that “elections have consequences” for the judiciary and the
218
law. In these statements, Senator Graham recognized that although
law and politics are not synonymous, they have an intertwined
relationship in which political events have repercussions for the law.
Although senators rarely explicitly challenge each other’s views of the
relationship between law and politics, these statements from Senators
Sessions, Leahy, Biden, and Graham reveal deep differences.
Second, the arguments that proponents of each view put forth as
to why their view best vindicates the values implicated by the
confirmation process also reveal these differing views on the
relationship between law and politics. The emphasis that adherents
put on certain values instead of other values reflects their views with
respect to the relationship between law and politics, even if unspoken
or subconscious.
For the assertive view, law and politics can be either completely
distinct or not distinct at all. Either way, senators focus intensely on a
nominee’s ideological views. Although the justifications of the
assertive view are at opposite ends of the spectrum in describing the
relationship between law and politics, they lead to the same
conclusion as to how the Senate should approach its role in the
219
confirmation process. This view does not mask differences; it brings
them to the forefront to expose the consequences of those
differences. For example, under the assertive view, senators
emphasize the importance of judicial accountability and the Senate’s
role as a check on nominees, suggesting that the appearance of
judicial independence is not as important as holding judges
220
accountable. Likewise, senators are not as concerned about making
the process easy for nominees; instead, senators are concerned with
learning a nominee’s ideological beliefs to ensure those beliefs
221
conform to the law. And finally, proponents of the completedistinction justification claim that the rule of law is best upheld when
222
the law is kept separate from politics.
By contrast, proponents of the deferential view emphasize the
need for judicial independence and social cohesion. Because this view
rests on the underdeterminacy of law, it recognizes the influence of

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Graham, supra note 18.
See supra Part I.A.1.
See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
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both politics and traditional methods of judicial decisionmaking on
223
Adherents of the deferential view
the development of law.
emphasize these values because giving judges, who tangentially
reflect public opinion, the freedom to make decisions ensures that the
law reflects society’s values while still separating the law enough from
224
politics to ensure that it will garner respect and be followed. Like
proponents of the assertive view, proponents of the deferential view
also argue that their approach best protects the rule of law because it
appreciates the impact of politics on the law without forcing the law
225
to fit within a particular political ideology. Thus, their arguments
are premised on the idea that the law and politics are related but not
inseparable.
The debate highlighted in Part III could theoretically provide a
basis for resolving which view is better if senators and scholars could
agree about the relative importance of each value. In some instances,
the assertive view better vindicates certain values, whereas in other
instances, the deferential view does. Even if using these values to
decide which senatorial role is better were possible, making the
decision on these terms would be misguided because it would ignore
the deeper disagreement between the two views. The underlying
disagreement about the relationship between law and politics leads
proponents to talk past each other when their debate is based on
values that they weigh differently. Although they argue over the same
values implicated in the confirmation process, those values are not
the only subject of dispute. A more robust—and more useful—debate
can be had by considering the way each side views the relationship
between law and politics.
Of course, even conclusively resolving the debate over the
relationship between law and politics might not clearly identify the
Senate’s proper role in the confirmation process. Realistically,
however, a resolution to the law-and-politics question is not
226
possible—or at least it is not probable anytime soon —so debates
over the Senate’s role may still turn back to historical practice or
pragmatic arguments about the values involved in the process. But

223. See supra note 54.
224. See supra notes 57–60, 181, 205 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.
226. For an article offering a new theory of the relationship between law and politics and
describing older theories, see generally Robert Post, Theorizing Disagreement: Reconceiving the
Relationship Between Law and Politics, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1319 (2010).
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with the model developed in this Note, those debates can now include
and incorporate the role that the disparate views of the relationship
between law and politics plays in this disagreement.
CONCLUSION
After more than a decade with no Supreme Court nominations,
five nominations to the Supreme Court were made between 2005 and
2010, as were many contentious lower court nominations. These
nominations brought renewed attention to the issue of the Senate’s
role in judicial confirmations. With no clear original understanding or
historical practice illuminating the meaning of the Advice and
Consent Clause, the values implicated in the confirmation process
often provide the foundation for the debate over which view better
achieves the purposes of having the Senate involved in the
confirmation process. These debates, however, only mask an
underlying, fundamental area of disagreement: the proper
relationship between law and politics. The arguments made in
support of each view based on these values reveal divergent
underlying premises. This Note identifies this underlying
disagreement so that future discussions of the Senate’s role in the
confirmation process can focus on this important issue. With a better
understanding of the underlying debate over the Senate’s role in the
confirmation process, scholars and senators can now debate the
Senate’s proper role within a more useful framework.

